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The Business of the Supreme Court 
Revisited 
John ~aul Jones 
Sixty-eight years ago, Felix Frankfutter and 
M. Landis published The Business of the 
Court: A Study in the Federal Judi-
System. Its eight chapters originally appeared 
in the Harvard Law Reviev.1, the first in 
of 1925, and the last in April of1927. When 
work afterward emerged as a book, its 
dedicated it to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
acknowledging his twenty-five Terms as a 
of the Supreme Court of the United 
My copy of The Business of the Supreme 
has been ill used by time, as have both 
validity of its basic assumption and the 
of its research. My copy is thickened by a 
binding; its curved covers close like a 
around pages brown with age and stiff 
decay. At some time since its binding, it 
been left to the damp; now it is stained, and 
smell s of mildew. When this book first 
as a history oflegislation it epitomized 
latest trend in legal scholarship ; now, the 
of its focus best illustrates its 
When first published, its underlying 
that the Supreme Court's workload 
beyond the Court's control went unques-
now, that assumption is regularly ques-
The book is dated and myopic. It is, 
ess, a classic in the strictest sense. It is 
composed and presented. It superbly 
a wider-ranging scholarship of which its 
were recognized pioneers. As the early 
of scholar-reformers influential in the 
of American legal culture, it ought to 
be of enduring interest to students of social as 
well as legal history. 
Felix Frankfurter's name is surely familiar, 
but that of James McCauley Landis, his coau-
thor, is likely less so. When they wrote the book, 
Frankfurter had been for eleven years a member 
of the faculty of the Harvard Law School, and 
Landis, his former student, had returned after 
graduation to act as Professor Frankfurter's 
research assistant and pursue Harvard's brand-
new degree, Doctor of Juridical Science. Frank-
furter would make his historical mark as the 
protege of the Progressive leader Justice Louis 
Brandeis, as advisor to both Roosevelt Presi-
dents, and eventually, as an often-dissenting Jus-
tice in the Supreme Court of the United States, 
most notably during Chief Justice Earl Warren's 
stewardship. 1 James McCauley Landis, while 
perhaps not as famous as his coauthor, played 
key leadership roles in the New Deal, both in 
reviving the Federal Trade Commission and in 
launching the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. At the tender age of thirty-six, Landis 
became dean of the Harvard Law School. Even-
tually, he would end a distinguished career of 
public service as a close advisor to President 
John F. Kennedy.2 
The Business of the Supreme Court was 
well received at its publication. Harold Lasswell 
wrote in The American Journal of Sociology: 
That such a book as this should issue 
from the most famous law school in 
the United States is nothing less than 
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an epochal event. It evidences the 
broadening of research interests on 
the part of the instructional staff, and 
this is presumably hot without effect 
upon the actual routine of law train-
ing. In view of the peculiar depen-
dence of American polity upon the 
lawyer, this is truly a matter of national 
concern.3 
From Princeton, John Dickinson wrote that 
one of the outstanding values of this book was 
the light it shined on the processes and quality 
of American legislation. 
The thoroughness and detail of this 
account disclose, as would a similar 
account of the history of any other 
important branch of legislation, the 
enormous slowness of our legislative 
process, and the character of the 
obstacles it must overcome.4 
Edward S. Corwin, never a generous critic, 
found the work " . . . based on wide research, 
... well arranged and pleasingly written. It suf-
fers, if anything, from the excess of its virtues."5 
W.P.M. Kennedy, writing for the English His-
torical Review, was lavish in his praise: 
The history of the nation seems to 
pass before us, as we follow the de-
tails of the "business" of the Supreme 
Court in interpreting the Constitution 
. . . Nowhere else is it possible to study 
in such a fine setting the interaction 
of political, economic, and legal forces 
in the jurisprudence of a modern 
state.6 
In The Business of the Supreme Court, 
Frankfurter and Landis confronted a recurring 
problem for the Supreme Cowt, a docket over-
crowded with requests for appellate review. 
Attributing this oversupply in the Highest Cowt 
to growth in the business of courts below, the 
authors traced, from the fi rst judiciary act in 1789 
to the so-called "Judges' Bill" of 1925, a long 
line of congressional reactions to perceived needs 
or faults in federal jurisdiction. For the most part, 
the authors concentrated on three major changes 
in their chronicle of juri sdictional evolution: 
_Frankfurter 's coauthor, James McCauley Landis, became 
dean of Harvard Law School a t age thirty-six after hal'-
ing helped establish severa l New Deal agencies, including 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
elimination of circuit riding by Supreme Court 
Justices, establishment of intermediate federal 
courts of appeal, and gradual replacement of 
statutory rights of appeal in the Supreme Court 
with forms of appellate review affording the 
Court the power to refuse a hearing. In passing, 
Frankfurter and Landis made note of lesser 
jurisdictional modifications, such as changes to 
the way decisions of the Comt of Claims and 
tetTitOiial courts are reviewed, and the brief life 
of the Commerce Court. Some of these topics, 
like circuit riding, may seem of interest today 
only to historians of the Comt, but others touch 
on matters of modern as well as historical rel-
evance. For example, the account by FrankfUJter 
and Landis of bills in both houses of the forty-
fourth Congress to withhold federal jurisdiction 
in cases arising from the actions of corporations 
outside the state of their incorporation7 certainly 
seems relevant to recent discussions of the con-
tinued importance of diversity jurisdiction. The 
book's contrast of the relative success of a court 
entertaining nothing but appeals from adminis-
tration of the tariff laws with the short life of the 
court established to review nothing but orders of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission provides 
intrigu: 
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a useful background to contemporary debate con-
cerning new courts for other subjects now deemed 
more or less specialized. Only in 1988 would 
occur the apparently final step in congressional 
substitution for appeals to the Supreme Court as 
a matter of right of appellate forms affording the 
Court the power to refuse review.8 
Even the long and detailed account (with 
which Professor Corwin expressed impatience) 
of the process by which circuit riding by the 
Justices was ultimately abandoned offers some 
intriguing food for contemporary thought. Most 
students of the Court's history are probably 
familiar with the practical difficulties confront-
ing early Justices attempting to fulfill their cir-
cuit riding duties, especially those assigned to 
the frontier circuits. Most are also likely to 
recall that an appreciation of these difficulties 
led the last Congress controlled by Federalists 
to dispense with such requirements after little 
more than a decade. It is conventional wisdom 
that partisan retaliation by congressional mem-
bers of Jefferson's Republican Party prompted 
legislation the following year, frustrating that 
salutary reform. Not so widely known, perhaps, 
is why circuit riding by Supreme Court Justices 
remained a requirement long after the Federal-
ists among the national judiciary were outnum-
bered by Jeffersonian Republicans. In 1838, for 
example, Justice John McKinley traveled 10,000 
miles and faced a docket of nearly two thirds of 
all the cases then pending in a federal circuit 
court. 9 Justice Peter V Daniel in 1851 covered 
7,000 miles in two months. 10 Both men were 
nominated to the Supreme Court by President 
Martin Van Buren, a Jefferson disciple, and con-
fumed by Congresses controlled by his party's 
successor. Frankfurter and Landis reveal that 
apparently influential members of several Con-
gresses regarded circuit riding by individual Jus-
tices as necessary for an adequate appreciation 
by the Court collectively of the subtleties of state 
and local law. Congressional satisfaction with 
circuit riding sufficient to prevent reform there-
fore persisted, even when the requirement gored 
judicial oxen of the same party, and even as ter-
ritorial expansion added appeals in ever-increas-
ing numbers to the Supreme Court's docket, so 
that a Justice's collegial duties to the national 
tribunal came in ever-sharper conflict with his 
duties to his circuit. 
Frankfurter and Landis attributed a second 
phase of growth in judicial review demand to 
"vast extensions of federal jurisdiction" follow-
ing the Civil War. They pointed to not only the 
familiar example of the Judiciary Act of 1875, 
for the first tin1e opening federal as well as state 
courts to most cases involving federal law, but 
also to a host of enactments permitting defen-
dants to shift cases from state to federal court in 
more or less specific circumstances. The authors' 
sage observation regarding this "revolution" 
bears repeating: 
The history of the federal courts is 
woven into the history of the times. 
The factors in our national life which 
came in with reconstruction are the 
same factors which increased the 
business of t he federa l courts, 
enlarged their jurisdiction, modified 
and expanded their structure. The 
problems, to be sure, are the recur-
ring problems which began with the 
First Judiciary Act and are active to-
day; they are the enduring problems 
of the relation of states to nation. But 
their incidence and intensity have var-
ied, as they are bound to vary at dif-
ferent epochs. For law and courts are 
instruments of adjustment, and the 
compromises by which the general 
problems of federalism are succes-
sively met determine the contempo-
raneous structure of the federal courts 
and the range of their authority.11 
Ironically, in light of its title, The Business 
of the Supreme Court is much less concerned 
with judicial than with legislative history. The 
book is vittually devoid of the stuff of what then 
constituted conventional Supreme Court schol-
arship, doctrine and biography. Inside its 
covers, the influence of events, theory, and per-
sonality on the decisional work of the Cowt is 
simply left unaddressed. Perhaps the authors 
considered Charles Warren's recent work to have 
occupied any wider field of institutional schol-
arship.12 Moreover, as legislative history, The 
Business of the Supreme Court is limited, in 
the main, to materials found in formal and open 
sources, such as congressional records, official 
collections, and legal periodicals. The authors 
made few references to the larger political and 
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social forces influencing Congress's inclination 
to tinker with federal jurisdiction. Missing, for 
example, is how the federal courts' admiralty 
jurisdiction was extended in the early nineteenth 
century to inland waters as the nation embraced 
the Mississippi's watershed and the Great Lakes. 
The architect of this enlargement of federal 
judicial power was unquestionably Justice Story, 
both from the Bench of the Supreme Court and 
behind the scenes in Congress. Because Justice 
Story penned an anomalous opinion for the Court 
in The Thomas Jejjerson13 to the contrary, it is 
surely of interest that the steamboat in that case 
was owned by brothers of Senator Johnson of 
Tennessee, sponsor of an ultimately unsuccess-
ful bill to limit federal maritime jurisdiction to 
cases involving tidal waters. 14 
The preoccupation of the authors with legis-
lation as the remedy for an overworked Supreme 
Court must have made the book especially curi-
ous to contemporary readers conversant with 
trends in legal scholarship. Frankfurter and 
Landis presented the history of Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction as one of more or less timely 
congressional development in response to 
observed superabundance of requests for 
Supreme Court review. The authors said practi-
cally nothing about the Court's own efforts to 
manage more efficiently its crowded dockets and 
minimize delay in its judgments. In the forma. 
tive period of which Frankfurter and Landis 
wrote, when most review by the Court belonged 
to the litigant losing in a lower court by right, 
the workload of the Supreme Court was surely 
affected by several of i ts own decisions. 
Examples include: the decision in Barron v. Ba/. 
timore15 that the Bill of Rights did not bind states· 
the decision in Ex parte McCardle16 that Con: 
gress could strip the Court of jurisdiction to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus (even in a case in 
wh ich oral argument had already been heard); 
the decision in The Civil Rights Cases17 that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not reach acts of 
private racism; and the Court's uncontestable 
presumption announced three years later in Santa 
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.18 
Felix Frankfurter answered questions at his confirmation hearings in 1939 with the coaching of Dean Acheson, his 
advisor (sitting to his right). Perhaps no other nominee has been so familiar with the Cout·t and its workings: Frank· 
furter had written extensively about the institution during his iUush·ious teaching career at Harvard Law School. Acheson. 
an attorney in private practice, had been a clerk to Justice Louis D. Brandeis. 
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that corporations were persons enjoying rights 
under the Fowteenth Amendment. These deci-
sions regarding the reach ofthe Constitution set 
the outer limits of jurisdiction, and thus influ-
enced the dockets of all courts charged with its 
enforcement. Among the courts so affected was 
the Supreme Court itself, which had, in Martin 
"·Hunter's Lessee, 19 1aid claim to the power to 
dispose of appeals that the highest court of a state 
had erred in its interpretation of the national 
charter. Frankfurter and Landis made brief men-
tion only of congressional reaction to McCardle20 
and referred to Martin v. Hunter 's Lessee only 
for Justice Story's dictum regarding the obliga-
tion of Congress to confer on the lower federal 
comts all jurisdiction permitted by Article III.21 
No mention of Barron v. Baltimore, The Civil 
Rights Cases, or Santa Clara County appears in 
The Business of the Supreme Court at all. 
If j udgments of the Court respecting juris-
diction under Article III of the Constitution are 
conspicuous by their general absence from The 
Business of the Supreme Court, other steps by 
the Court both tending to and intended to move 
cases more rapidly to decision were noted by 
Frankfmter and Landis, albeit in passing. One 
such step was the imposition of limits on oral 
argument. In a footnote, they recounted how, 
in 1812, the Court announced a rule of practice 
for the first time limiting to two the number of 
counsel permitted to argue for each side in a 
cause. In three sentences, they present the 
Court's establishment in 1849 of limits on how 
long each counsel could hold forth. As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist tells the same story else-
where, 
Originally there was no limit set on the 
time a lawyer might devote to argu-
ing his case in the Court. Indeed, the 
Court had so little to do in its first few 
years that it would have had no good 
reason to place time limits on coun-
sels' arguments . . . But as the Su-
preme Court's docket grew more 
crowded, this sort of expenditure of 
time in a very important case [five full 
Court days in Gibbons v. Ogden] 
proved to be a luxury. In the middle 
of the nineteenth century the Court 
placed a limit of two hours on the time 
to be taken by counsel for each side.22 
No mention was made in The Business of 
the Supreme Court of another 1849 innovation 
by the Court, a rule that, when a case has been 
called for argument in two successive Terms, and 
neither party is prepared to argue it, the case shall 
be dismissed.23 Finally, there was no mention of 
the Coutt's development of the practice of dis-
missing summarily appeals of right for want of 
a substantial federal question, or when the deci-
sion of a state court is sustainable on state law 
grounds, although the fmmer has been traced to 
a decision in 1868,24 and the latter to a decision 
seven years later.25 
Frankfurter and Landis offered a picture of 
appellate jurisdiction evolving in response to 
strains on the Court's capacity for judicial 
review. If that picture is less than comprehen-
sive because it concentrates on legis lative 
changes to the exclusion of the Court's doctrinal 
and procedural home remedies, it is neverthe-
less trend-setting scholarship, all the more note-
worthy because its Harvard-trai ned authors 
eschewed study of Supreme Court case law in 
favor of study of federal legislation. Frankfurter 
and Landis wrote from Harvard less than fifty 
years after Christopher Columbus Langdell had 
revolutionized the study oflaw by promoting the 
critical interpretation of judicial opinions and 
persuading legal scholars that a science of law 
could be induced from the utterances of judges 
administering the common law. This revolution 
began at the Harvard Law School, where 
Langdell became dean in 1870, but soon spread 
nationwide, as Langdell's disciples migrated to 
other schools.26 Preoccupied with the common 
law, Langdell 's new science discounted the con-
tribution of legislation, and its examination was 
consequently discouraged. 
While law professors in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries were confining their 
students to analyzing judicial opinions, frustra-
tion in the greater world beyond law school with 
the lawmaking of judges was prompting more 
frequent resort to legislation for dealing with 
emergent social and economic challenges. At 
the same time the initiative shifted from court-
house to legislature, the rate of lawmaking 
accelerated, in response to the rapidity of change 
in an industrial age. There dawned what Dean 
Calabresi has aptly named the Age ofStatutes.27 
Legal education and scholarship could lag only 
so far behind, and to Langdell 's fixation with 
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the common law, there inevitably arose a reac-
tion. The early leaders of this react ion, James 
Bradley Thayer, Holmes, and Roscoe Pound, all 
influenced Frankfurter, inculcating a skepticism 
about doctrine and a recognition of law's wider 
antecedents. Indeed, Dean Pound, the broker of 
the modern marriage of law and socio logy, 
brought Frankfurter to the Harvard faculty, as 
Frankfurter subsequently brought Landis. In the 
year following publication of The Business of 
the Supreme Court, Harvard named Landis its 
first research professor of legislation. Taking note 
of this appointment, The Nation found it illus-
trative of "The New Legal Education." In its 
own way this reaction to Langdellian method and 
jurisprudence was a revolution, and The Busi-
ness of the Supreme Court one of the clearest 
trumpet calls. 
When The Business of the Supreme Court 
was published, its greatest strength was its 
attention to legislation as a primary source of 
law. Audaciously, the authors demonstrated 
legislation's importance to jurisdiction, the very 
law that regulates judicial power. That approach 
presented a bold challenge to the presumption 
that case analysis alone constituted legal schol-
arship. Ironically, that approach has, over time, 
mutated into the book's greatest weakness, as 
scholars have continued to recognize and explore 
additional facets of lawmaking. That the book is 
now obsolete ought not justify that it is now 
neglected, but it explains it. 
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